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14. ABSTRACT <p>Despite conducting the second deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11, LeT has remained an afterthought to many in the Western counter-terrorism world. LeT is a global takfiri organization that considers itself a protector of the entire Umma. The group has carried out operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against American troops, has placed cells in multiple Western European countries as well as the United States, and its robust training apparatus continues to produce some of the most highly skilled operators not only for itself but for Al Qaeda and other organizations. A spectacular attack against the US emanating from graduates of a LeT camp will occur if we maintain the current policy towards Pakistan and its LeT.</p>						
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

**LASHKAR-E-TAIBA:
A GLOBAL THREAT TODAY, A THREAT TO PAKISTAN TOMORROW**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA:

A GLOBAL THREAT TODAY, A THREAT TO PAKISTAN TOMORROW

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Thesis: The current US strategy is ineffective and requires a re-examination of the Lashkar-e-Taiba threat.

Discussion: Despite conducting the second deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11, LeT has remained an afterthought to many in the Western counter-terrorism world. This was due to the justified emphasis on Al Qaeda but also due in large part to a lack of understanding that the group is not simply a regional actor. LeT is a global takfiri organization that considers itself a protector of the entire Umma. Mumbai was an attack against the West carried out in India. Understanding LeT requires an examination of the group's Ahl-i-Hadith brand of Islam. The group has carried out operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against American troops, has placed cells in multiple Western European countries as well as the United States, and its robust training apparatus continues to produce some the most-highly skilled operators not only for itself but for Al Qaeda and other organizations. The group has and will continue to plan and conduct attacks against the unbelievers or the West. The West cannot expect Pakistan to counter or contain the group because a deeper understanding of Pakistani Military and the ISI reveals all three group's strategic goals are aligned.

Conclusion: LeT is a Salafist violent extremist organization whose members seek a pan-Islamic Caliphate that practices an orthodox and intolerant version of Islam. It is the prediction of this author a spectacular attack emanating from graduates of a LeT camp will occur on US soil in next 20 years if we chose to maintain the current policy towards Pakistan and its LeT.

Introduction

The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, the “Army of the Pure”) brought world attention to this relatively unknown organization. LeT fedayeen infiltrated into Mumbai via a commandeered maritime platform and conducted a four day siege of Western and Jewish landmarks in the tourist district of Mumbai. The fedayeen were not suicide bombers but combatants that fought until they succumbed to combat injuries taking as many “infidels” with them as possible in the process. 166 people died in the attacks making it the second deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11.¹ The locations of the attacks were specifically chosen by an American LeT operative at the direction of LeT Commander Sajid Mir because they had high concentrations of Westerners. Those who could identify the organization that conducted the Mumbai attack would categorize LeT as a Pakistani militant organization at odds with India over the disputed Kashmir region. This is a categorical misrepresentation of the organization and displays a lack of understanding about the group’s beliefs, strategic goals, and means. What was revealed after the attack was the gunmen had been specifically tasked to kill as many Westerners as possible with an emphasis on Americans and Jews. More specifically, precedence was given to the attackers to kill Western Jews over the Indian Jews at the synagogue that was targeted.² Regrettably, LeT has remained an afterthought to many in the Western counter-terrorism world. This was due to the justified emphasis on Al Qaeda (AQ) but also due in large part to a lack of understanding that the group is not simply a regional actor.³ LeT is clearly a global takfiri organization that considers itself a protector of the Umma. The group has carried out operations in Iraq and Afghanistan against American troops, has placed cells in multiple Western European countries as well as the United States, and its robust training apparatus continues to produce

some the most-highly skilled operators not only for itself but for Al Qaeda and other organizations.⁴

LeT is not an insurgency. LeT is a protected proxy of the state of Pakistan. Simply put, LeT has created a niche by doing for the state what the state cannot do for itself. This includes military operations as well as social services.⁵ LeT's role as a military proxy for Pakistan's conflict with India is well known. The group's role as a social services provider is not. The social programs of LeT include construction of schools and hospitals, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and covers gaps where the state cannot provide equivalent services.⁶ This has endeared the group not only to the populace but to the Pakistan government as well.⁷ Drawing from its Ahl-i-Hadith background, the organization places a cultural emphasis on education which is manifested in its madrasas that teach not only the Koran but science, math and English as well as social sciences.⁸ Thus these training camps produce not only an indoctrinated but also an educated operator.

The current US strategy for countering LeT has not mitigated the organization's expansion since Mumbai nor has it deterred the group from planning future operations against American and Western interests.⁹ It is a mistake to wait until any group completes a successful attack against the West to take corrective action. LeT has demonstrated on multiple occasions it has the will to attack Western targets and it is simply a matter of time until it has the means.¹⁰ A strategy must be formulated that inhibits the development of means until the ideology that seeks to destroy the West is isolated and mitigated. The current US strategy is ineffective and requires a re-examination of the Lashkar-e-Taiba threat.

What is the Problem?

To develop an effective strategy against LeT, an examination of its origins, culture, and its relationship with the Pakistani state provides context for understanding the global takfiri

aspirations of this organization. The assumption that LeT is simply a South Asia terrorist group must be discarded and a thorough study of the organization will provide ample evidence to dismiss this misplaced theory. An understanding of the culture of the Ahl-i-Hadith movement from whence LeT developed will explain the petri dish that cultured the organization and will illuminate the fundamentalist mindset of its members. To understand the group's protected status with the Pakistani Military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate one must examine the cultural heritage of all three organizations to understand their indirect and direct ties. Further, a successful strategy must understand the true nature and goals of the "Army of the Pure". The goal of this paper is for the reader to gain a clear understanding of the threat LeT poses and a closer examination and re-evaluation of the organization is required in order to develop a cogent plan to mitigate it.

Origin of Lashkar-e-Taiba

It must be acknowledged the greatest influence on the development of LeT was in the Indian-Pakistan rivalry and the violent competition for the disputed Kashmir region.¹¹ However, it is important to understand that the founders of LeT were involved in the anti-Soviet/anti-Western Jihad in Afghanistan prior to taking up arms in Kashmir. Thus the origins of the organization were not fighting India but rather fighting non-Muslim Western invaders and a perceived threat to Islam. The organization was not disbanded after 9/11 during Musharaf's crackdown on similar groups because of the combination of controllability by ISI, the good will generated by LeT's social welfare programs, and LeT's success as a proxy in Kashmir. This kept it not only immune to crackdowns but favored and valuable.¹² LeT was Pakistan's most willing, lethal, and reliable proxy in Kashmir.¹³ This is both a source of strength and a critical vulnerability for US strategy purposes for without the approval of the state, LeT would not be able to exist. However,

LeT does not view itself as an organization that exists solely for the jihad in Kashmir. In concert with the original aspirations of the founders it was only natural for LeT to return to the battlefield of Afghanistan. In the post 9/11 war in Afghanistan the threat to Islam in the minds of LeT was now America and its allies.¹⁴

The organization's ability to harmonize its various operations is a key tenet to its resilience.¹⁵ The aftermath of the Mumbai attack was not a setback for the organization. In fact, since 2008 their activities in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and throughout South East Asia have expanded and their operational reach and interaction with other organizations have increased.¹⁶ LeT and Al Qaeda are very similar in many regards. To understand these similarities one should consider Abdullah Azzam. Azzam was a Soviet-era mujahedeen in Afghanistan who formed one of the precursors for Al Qaeda (Maktab al Khidmat) and was also a founding member of Markaz-ud Dawa-wal-Irshad (Center for Preaching and Guidance, or MDI).¹⁷ MDI is the umbrella organization for which LeT is the military arm. The ideology and leaders of MDI and LeT are one and the same but terrorist acts and violent jihad are done in the name of LeT. LeT never lost its vision as a global defender of the Umma. Even during the 1990s when LeT was focused on Kashmir, the organization continued to provide fighters for global takfiri efforts to include fighting in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸ The first priority for US strategy for LeT does not have to solve Pakistan's LeT problem or India's LeT problem. The first priority should be trying to prevent global takfiri attacks on America or its interests. It should recognize this organization as a valid and current threat to American interests abroad in addition to attacks inside the borders of the US. This strategy must begin with understanding the cultural and religious basis for LeT's ideology.

Understanding Cultural Implications and Ahl-i-Hadith sect of Islam

The Ahl-i-Hadith is a minority sect of Sunni Islam and comprises between seven to ten percent of the Pakistani population. The majority of the population is of the Deobandi sect with Barelvi comprising the rest. Violent extremist organizations like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqanni network are products of Deobandi ideology.¹⁹ The small Ahl-i-Hadith sect is a fundamentalist movement that originated in India in the early 19th century.²⁰ This movement rejects all texts other than the Koran and the Hadith.²¹ Thus, Ahl-i-Hadith is in many ways an elitist movement as it considers Muslims who do not follow its path to be inferior but does not go so far to be a takfiri group which says those who do not follow their brand of Islam are non-believers.²² In contemporary terms one may describe the Ahl-i-Hadith as a Salafist movement and LeT are the ten percent within Ahl-i-Hadith whose beliefs extend into the extreme takfiri ideology and actions.²³ The strategic goal of the original members of MDI/LeT was to unite the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, then turn the entire Muslim population of Pakistan to the Ahl-i-Hadith sect, and promote the purification of the society.²⁴

The majority of the takfiri groups in Pakistan are of the Deobandi sect of Sunni Muslims. LeT is the only viable takfiri group of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Sunni Muslims.²⁵ The establishment of a Shia extremist regime in Iran and its expanding influence was a primary factor in the Pakistani government's support of Sunni militant groups as a way of checking expanding Iranian influence. These actions emboldened Shia militant groups within Pakistan.²⁶ The government of Pakistan was not able or willing to take on the role of directly countering Shia groups but was more than willing to allow Sunni militant organizations to do it for them.²⁷ Additionally, LeT and other groups were reinforced and bolstered by Saudi Arabia and Sadaam-era Iraq who funded Sunni militant groups in Pakistan as a proxy to their own efforts to check the expansion of Iran who was funding Shia militant groups in Pakistan.²⁸

The fundamentalist Ahl-i-Hadith followers are essentially the South Asia version of the Salafist movement originating out of Egypt or the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia.²⁹ There are approximately 15 to 17 Ahl-e-Hadith organizations in Pakistan.³⁰ LeT is the only Ahl-e-Hadith organization that extols a violent and compulsory form of jihad. Divisions and angst exist within the Ahl-i-Hadith community regarding LeT. The Ahl-i-Hadith mindset is the driver behind LeT's success in developing a robust and efficient training apparatus and its disdain for non-Muslims. The Ahl-i-Hadith are considered pious and studious in nature.³¹ This mindset is the impetus for the superior school systems developed by the Ahl-i-Hadith which are among the best in Pakistan.³² The Ahl-i-Hadith are fundamentalist but appreciate the need for an education that includes traditional subjects eschewed at madrasas of other sects. The Ahl-i-Hadith talent for developing excellent institutions for learning translates directly into the superior training apparatus developed and implemented by LeT. The training camps are regimented and uniform in their instruction so that consistently high results are produced across the enterprise.³³ Any strategy that attempts to mitigate LeT and/or the other groups that send their operatives to these camps must appreciate the Ahl-i-Hadith approach to education. A deeper understanding of the Ahl-i-Hadith sect would help the planner understand LeT's deadly faction within this minority of the population.

The Pakistan Military and ISI relationship with LeT

Many may ask why LeT has been allowed to exist by the Pakistani government. The favored status of LeT extends past their mutual goals for Kashmir, abating Shia militancy, and covering the state's gaps in social services. Essentially those are business dealings. More importantly, LeT and ISI have familial linkages.³⁴ Both organizations are primarily Punjabi. Understanding this cultural connection helps one understand the shadowy linkage between LeT and the official

government. It also helps explain why LeT became favored when the crackdown on Shia occurred. Additionally, understanding the relationship between the State and LeT provides an opportunity for creating fractures by exploiting the Salafist/Hadith disdain for non-shura governing body.

Understanding the mindset of Pakistani military also provides insight into the tolerance of violent extremist groups and their use as proxies to fight Pakistan's conflicts. Pakistani military consider the group to be patriots and General Officers send their children to get first class educations in LeT's superior boarding schools.³⁵ The motto of the Pakistani military (PAKMIL) is "Jihad in the name of Allah."³⁶ Further evidence of this mindset is the book "Koranic Concepts of War" is required reading for all PAKMIL officers. This book is a fundamentalist Islamic doctrine for war and provides justification for violence in defense of threats to Islam. Understanding this mindset is the first step in coming to grips with the notion that counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy alone will not work in Pakistan because LeT is not merely an insurgency.

It must be restated that ISI does not control or direct LeT. ISI does maintain influence over LeT but this may be fading as LeT strengthens its external lines of funding.³⁷ LeT efforts to wean itself financially are indications it seeks to exercise an increased operational capability beyond what ISI is willing to tolerate.³⁸ It has been suggested that LeT made a major leap forward and became financially independent as a result of the enormous influx of charity donations from the recent floods in Pakistan.³⁹ There are even indications that individuals within LeT are seeking to develop greater operational capability than what the government of Pakistan currently possesses. In other words, LeT is potentially capable of conducting external attacks on the magnitude that not even the Pakistan military or ISI would be capable of conducting. When

confronted by the West on why LeT continues to operate unchallenged by Pakistan they provide a weak argument. The Pakistan government contends LeT is too dangerous and capable and a crackdown would result in LeT turning on the government.⁴⁰

Another example of Pakistan's condoning of LeT's actions is LeT's operations in Iraq. Analysis would indicate LeT's involvement in Iraq was sanctioned. In 2004 four LeT operatives were detained in Basra.⁴¹ Initially identified by numbers in their phones back to known LeT operatives in Pakistan, it was established that not only were they LeT but the senior member of those detained was a close associate of the co-leader of LeT and was previously the commander for all forward camps west of the line of control into Kashmir. One could infer by sending the forward commander who coordinated daily with the Pakistani Military for Kashmir operations from 1997-2001 was an effort by LeT to open a new front against the enemies of Islam in Iraq with the full knowledge of ISI and the Pakistani military.⁴²

Global Aspirations

LeT's perspective is returning to its roots. The younger members are increasingly oriented towards a global takfiri mindset with a greater desire to be seen as defenders of the Umma instead of liberators of Kashmir. Mumbai was not an attack against India. Mumbai was an attack against the West carried out in India.. This is an important distinction to those who consider LeT merely a regional actor. LeT was not viewed by those directing the development of the West's current strategy as an organization with a global agenda and the ability to develop the potential to conduct spectacular attacks in the West. Rightly so, policy makers placed greater emphasis in the form of applying assets against the Iraq quagmire, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.⁴³ For those that consider LeT a Pakistan/India problem, a review of attacks conducted or attempted by the group should be considered.

- 2004 arrest of Dhiren Barot in UK for planning to detonate VBIEDs under buildings as well as for conducting surveillance on behalf of Al Qaeda in the US. Barot was trained in a LeT camp⁴⁴
- Willie Brigitte - LeT operative arrested in Australia in a plot to carry attacks there.⁴⁵
- The second Sydney Plot resulted in the arrest of 5 LeT trained men in Australia.⁴⁶
- LeT trained Jose Padilla.⁴⁷
- Fatwa calling for death of the Pope issued by the organization's leadership.⁴⁸
- Fatwa calling for the death of Terry Jones the Florida preacher who burned the Koran.⁴⁹
- Pre-attack surveillance conducted by Davis Headley on newspaper in Denmark which published cartoons of Muhammed.⁵⁰
- Deployment of LeT operatives to Iraq for operations against American troops.⁵¹

Clearly these initiatives demonstrate this organization has a global takfiri mindset with aspirations for extending terror beyond the India/Pakistan region. That said, another issue to consider is whether the group poses a strategic threat. They may be able to attack or plan attacks but will the impact or effect of the attack have strategic implications? The evidence indicates the global takfiri mindset of the organization coupled with perceived aggression by the US by this Salafist group along with the ever increasing operational capability means it is inevitable LeT will attempt to carry out an attack on the US.

Analysis of the recruitment of western members by the organization for surveillance missions also reinforces the premise LeT seeks to carry out attacks against the West. According a US Defense official there have been over 50 Americans trained by LeT.⁵² David Headley was a Pakistani-American recruited by Sajid Mir while he was in the LeT training pipeline. Headley received additional training to serve as a covert operative for the organization. For two years, he operated covertly in Mumbai providing LeT planners detailed reconnaissance reports.⁵³ The results of his reconnaissance enabled militarily precise execution of one of the deadliest terrorist attacks since 9/11. David Headley was not a one-off situation for LeT. Analysis would indicate there is a specific branch assigned to recruiting and training operatives for Western operations. The training and recruitment of Willie Brigette of France and Charles Wardle of New Zealand indicate a specific effort in that line of operation.⁵⁴

The new school of LeT increasingly wants to return to the grander aspiration of defending the Umma.⁵⁵ As stated previously the organization never gave up on its tenant of “Jihad against the West” but it was not the focus for the last thirty years. There is a movement inside the organization to return the primary focus and the preponderance of the organization’s ways and means toward achieving its global aspirations.⁵⁶ LeT operatives are conducting operations inside Afghanistan and specifically targeting US troops.⁵⁷ This is another example of the increased global takfiri mindset. Younger members would rather fight the great Satan of the West than India.⁵⁸ This mindset of the future leaders of the organization should not be discounted. In LeT’s manifesto, “Why We are Waging Jihad”, the US, Israel, and India are declared enemies of Islam.⁵⁹ The Near and Far Enemy concept of Al Qaeda has a similar notion with LeT.⁶⁰ Whereas LeT’s near enemy is not a repressive state government but India. However, where they align is with Israel and the US as the far enemy. Justification and motivation to plan an attack on

the US abounds in South Asia. Considering the stated goals of LeT it is inevitable an attack on the US will be attempted and current policy is not sufficient to mitigate the threat.

Change in Strategy is Necessary

There are numerous aspects policy makers should consider with regards to the LeT problem. The following paragraphs will discuss the most prominent issues for consideration. This section begins with a discussion of treating LeT as part of global insurgency and applying David Kilcullen principles of disaggregation. From there the following paragraphs address specific topics critical to countering the organization's ability carry out attacks against Western interests beginning with the most pertinent issue of shutting down LeT's and indirectly Al Qaeda's training apparatus. Additional topics discussed include the need to resolve our willingness to grant authorities to counter LeT, utilizing India's influence on Pakistani decision making, and areas within LeT's organization that are prime for fracturing the organization.

The Case for Disaggregation

“Interdict the links, and the insurgency's energy, structure and resilience dissipate.” - Kilcullen⁶¹

The disaggregation concept presented by David Kilcullen should be examined as a model for countering LeT. Kilcullen contends that modern terrorist groups like LeT are akin to global insurgencies.⁶² Indeed LeT's network extends across the globe. In the context of the state of Pakistan, LeT could more closely be compared to the Blackwater/Xe company of the US than an insurgency within Pakistan. The similarities diverge once you leave Pakistan. Xe operates legitimately with governments other than the US across the globe. LeT operates an insurgency across the globe. A global insurgency is too complex to be understood and strategized against with traditional counter-insurgency systems analysis. Disaggregation theory is built upon the

principles of Complexity Theory and enables for a greatly expanded understanding of interactions within the “system of systems.”⁶³

Disaggregation seeks to examine a series of systems and identify key nodes or points of tangent within the “system of systems” to enable it and its peripheral systems to function.⁶⁴ A key node can be a person, place, or thing. A person can be a single financier or a group of people that facilitate movement of organization. A place could be a particular airport that enables freedom of movement or a town that functions as sanctuary. A thing may be a website that enables clandestine communication within the system. Once key nodes are identified they are examined again to determine how they can be targeted and if there are optimal times to act. The delinking of nodes may create an environment where a delinking event that may not achieve a dramatic result on its own may lead to a “Gladwellian” tipping point.

A future strategy should be developed by a planning team or Task Force designated for a specified length of time with the sole purpose of developing a new counter LeT strategy. The planning team should involve a whole government cast of players that spend an allotted time conducting a structured research of the systems of LeT. Additionally, any person or organization attempting to develop a strategy utilizing disaggregation theory would require a fundamental understanding of Complexity Theory. An organization directed to develop a strategy to counter the threat posed by LeT may consider the following topics as systems within the group’s ecosystem to examine for vulnerability.

Stop the Training Apparatus

A threat possibly more dangerous than an actual attack emanating from LeT at the present time is an attack aided or carried out by someone they trained who went to work for another organization. LeT training camps are a gateway to global takfiri.⁶⁵ The cohesive nature of the

group is due in large part to the training apparatus. All members go through the same initial training regimen. This creates a shared experience that enables each member to instantly bond with others who have undergone the same process. There is an initial indoctrination into the Ahl-i-Hadith brand of Islam.⁶⁶ This is the gateway to the follow-on training where members are designated based on performance to take different educational and training paths.⁶⁷ The religious training up front is not nefarious and is open to all comers as part of the Ahl-i-Hadith mentality of purifying the religion. Another pertinent aspect is all LeT members are trained to be recruiters and the training apparatus produces what might be likened to a pyramid scheme with the system constantly rejuvenating itself.⁶⁸ Multiple foiled attacks against Western targets, including the Sydney and Perth bombing plots, had LeT training.⁶⁹ Stopping the training apparatus not only cuts off LeT source of operatives but other organizations as well. There is a litany of Al Qaeda operatives of western origin who learned their craft in LeT training camps. Notable names include David Hicks, Jose Padilla, Dhiren Barot, and Richard Reid amongst many others.⁷⁰

In Pakistan, Al Qaeda training camps are not tolerated by the US. However, LeT camps are not targeted by US drones nor are they shut down by the Pakistani Military. Diplomatically, demarches from Western countries only result in notification to the camps by the government that foreign intelligence services are aware of their presence.⁷¹ Any strategy that seeks to prevent LeT from attacking the US must stop the training apparatus. This is a key node not only for LeT but other organizations, notably Al Qaeda. Delinking the LeT training node would be a critical point in countering the global insurgency.

Create Divisions Within the “Ecosystem”

There are multiple opportunities to create fractures along cultural and ideological lines within LeT and disaggregate their network. It has been reported that disagreements within the group over money and the direction of operations have inspired members to form splinter organizations. Indeed it is believed the Khairun Naas organization was established due to a row over money as a result of the designation of LeT as a terrorist organization. The designation did not deter the militant member's desire to carry out acts of terror but a second order effect of the designation was their funds were diverted within their own organization.⁷² A key node to delink would be the group's connections to the Pakistani Military and the ISI. This will be difficult to accomplish because the three entities' goals are aligned as well as having a long-standing working and familial relationship. This is an example of nodes that are critical but not vulnerable. Certainly, a disaggregation strategy should seek ways to simultaneously sever the group's ties with Al Qaeda while using the group's relationship with Al Qaeda to disassociate the group from moderates. An example of this would be the blowback from Al Qaeda in Iraq's decapitation videos.

Exposure of Fraud

Exposure of fraud will destabilize the organization. Financial supporters that think their money is going to schools or social programs will be averse to donating if their money is being used to kill Pakistani clerics. Conversely, it has been demonstrated for other organizations, if a Jihadi financier reads his money is being used for drugs or pornography the money will dry up. Partnership with Gulf States could be particularly effective with constricting the flow of donor money into LeT. LeT's efforts to solicit funds from Saudi Arabia have been extensive and successful.⁷³ Other opportunities to expose the organization include use of students for pro-jihad

rallies while telling the parents the monies were for a science fair.⁷⁴ One additional opportunity would be timely exposure of LeT involvement in terrorist acts.

LeT's association with the criminal network in South Asia is exploitable. According to the Pakistani government in 2006 there were 34,000 students studying in Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas.⁷⁵ The Ahl-i-Hadithis are willing to teach modern curricula and in contrast to the Deobondi madrasas, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas typically include courses of English, mathematics, science, and Pakistan social studies. This broader education aspect makes the Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas more popular with moderate Pakistani Muslims. This also makes this more attractive for lower and middle-class Pakistanis because their children are getting a more rounded education than what is provided in a Deobondi madrasa.⁷⁶ The Ahl-i-Hadith madrasas produce high exam results which also makes them more appealing to the populace.

Leverage the Influence of India

There have been multiple LeT attacks in India since the Mumbai attack. India continues to absorb these but the next significant attack in India may involve Indians reacting kinetically. A strategy should consider establishing liaisons and processes for transmittal of evidentiary information to the Indians. The US and Western Intelligence outfits should be positioned to enable greater effect through intelligence sharing with targeting information. This will require fostering a greater partnership with the Indians and developing the conduit for that potential targeting information prior to an attack. This should be done with Pakistan's awareness with the situation explained in simple terms. Pakistan should be told outright we are playing both sides against the LeT threat to the US. A potential for blowback exists with such a strategy but is less likely to manifest in direct repercussions for the US as an attack perpetrated by graduates of an LeT camp.

Legitimize LeT as a political party

Designating LeT as a political party may cause disaggregation and help in exploitation efforts. Establishing LeT as an official political party allows access via the state. This will open the door for possible diplomatic conflict resolution. The Ahl-i-Hadith community could be leveraged to isolate and alienate the violent extremists within the movement because it discredits the Ahl-i-Hadith non-violent movement in Pakistan. Additionally, the radical factions of the group may sever their own ties because their fundamentalist views prevent them from submitting to a political process. These actions may further isolate the extremists and make their cause less appealing to those that consider the group a viable outlet.

Stronger central government will reduce the power of all militant groups in Pakistan. A well managed full funded education program that provides a superior and free education would be a desirable alternative to the free education system provided by the madrasas. This will benefit the state of Pakistan as well as the US and the West. It will take drastic measures at first to include restricting or outlawing the religious schools. A centrally managed and regionally executed education system that stresses qualification of students and teachers through standardized testing at elementary levels. The largest obstacle to overcome will be the role of ethnicity in education in the Pakistani culture. The second largest obstacle will be money coming in from Saudi Arabia that is funding the current education system in Pakistan. Prior to 2003 the Pakistanis spent less than 2% of their GDP on education which leaves a void readily filled by Wahabbi money coming from the Arabian peninsula.⁷⁷ Suggesting education reform may be stating the obvious but it will be the most effective means for changing the ideology even if it is currently unrealistic.

Upset the Balancing Act

LeT has to conduct a balancing act in so many aspects of its existence. This makes it susceptible to disaggregation. An example would be how the group must balance between jihad and its social welfare work. Too much either way causes factions and supporters to become disenchanted. They manage funding streams for their jihad endeavors as well as their social programs. Thus, they must demonstrate to their donors of both aspects that they are able to effectively able to conduct both types operations in order to continue receiving money for both enterprises. They must also be selective in their advertisement of success as donors for one aspect would be disinclined to contribute further if they knew their money donated for schools was contributing to the slaughter of civilians or vice versa.⁷⁸

The group walks a fine line between AQ and ISI, Saudi and ISI money, Deobandi, Taliba-Terek Pakistan, Ahl-i-Hadith principles and non-Hadith. Again, a deep understanding of the systems and their interactions would enable the identification of points of tangents that when stimulated would tip the balance against the network.

Additionally, different personalities pushing the groups in competing directions should be tracked and exploited where possible. For example, eventually the group will need to make a decision between the two current leaders on who will define the vision of the organization. This presents an exploitable opportunity. This faction can be used to disaggregate the group.

Tensions within Ahl-i-Hadith are also exploitable. LeT is the only Ahl-i-Hadith organization that considers jihad a compulsory obligation.⁷⁹ This volatile belief puts it at odds with the other Ahl-i-Hadith organizations worried about the survival of their sect in a country where they are a small minority and where violence is routinely used to solve cultural differences.

Authorities Paradigm

The political will to pursue LeT exists neither in Pakistan nor the US. This is an interesting problem if one considers the reasoning. The US routinely violates the sovereignty of Pakistan when it sends unmanned aerial vehicles into Pakistan to carry out drone strikes against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani targets. So one must ask why do LeT operatives not meet the threshold for drone strikes? LeT camps that have produced individuals that killed Americans continue to function despite these camps being known to the intelligence community. Diplomacy has been unsuccessful in deterring or shutting down the camps. The normal action by Pakistan in response to a demarche regarding a camp is to inform the camp commander they are now known to western intelligence groups with no further action taken.⁸⁰ The current US strategy is failing because it is an outside-in approach and is not taking proactive steps to halt the current behavior of the organization.

Target Operatives Coordinating Western Attacks

The US should consider a more direct approach when dealing with Pakistani based LeT operatives associated with attacks on the West. Designating an individual as a terrorist is not enough to dissuade LeT's plotting the death of innocent US civilians. The US has designated numerous members of LeT as terrorists but to what end?⁸¹ Designating a Pakistani based terrorist that operates freely with the approval of ISI only means he has to use an alias when he travels or attempts to conduct business outside the country.

We must acknowledge people exist who just want to watch the world burn. These people cannot be rationalized with and must be dealt with accordingly for the sake of the greater good. There was no retribution after Mumbai. Pakistan immediately declared if any Pakistanis were targeted by India it would mean war and if the US had targeted LeT it would have been to the same end as India would have been blamed. The cell phone traffic of Sajid Mir directing the

Mumbai attacks and speaking with Jewish hostages prior to having his men execute them left no doubt of his involvement in the operation. Sajid Mir was never arrested. Senior leaders were placed on fairly liberal house arrest.⁸² Most of the hundred LeT members arrested following the attacks have been released.⁸³ Additionally, there has been no retribution by the US or ISI for attacks inside Afghanistan. There are also indications of decreasing influence by ISI.⁸⁴ They are seeking to develop greater operational capability than what the government of Pakistan currently possesses. The US should initiate the long process of developing assets that could conduct precision targeting and collection.

Critiques of Disaggregation

The following paragraphs will discuss possible critiques of the aforementioned issues for consideration. Specifically, they will address the argument that increased pressure against LeT will send their well trained operatives into the waiting arms of Al Qaeda. Additionally, a counter-argument is presented that addresses the concept that disaggregated organization is harder to monitor and thus counter effectively.

May Go To Al Qaeda

A fractured organization has to overcome greater challenges to plan, finance, and conduct a complete operation than a cohesive unit. Some may argue that a disaggregation policy would push LeT trained operatives into AQ. This would actually make the operatives easier to target. The existing authorities that enable targeting of AQ would be extended to the former LeT operatives. An explanation for targeting AQ operatives is not generally required in the court of public opinion.

A Disaggregated Organization is Harder to Track

A fractured organization is harder to track. Similar to a busted covey of quail, a fractured organization has to communicate via external methods to talk within the organization. Anytime an organization member moves locations, communicates electronically, or performs an act, it can be tracked and potentially targeted. Joint Interagency Task Forces have been established to bring multi-disciplinary focus on a problem set with a measurable success in recent years. JIATF-South was so effective at tracking and intercepting narcotics in the Caribbean that narco-traffickers were forced to develop new routes through Mexico to get their products to the US.⁸⁵ This further illustrates a point that a JIATF is not a strategy but a function of a grander strategy and why a cohesive strategy for Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba is required. A JIATF will be able to help inhibit LeT 's operations while the long term programs like education begin the ligation of the extremist ideology.

Conclusion

In summary, it is clear the organization requires a closer examination and action on the part of the US. Lashkar-e-Taiba is not a South Asian insurgent group. LeT is a Salafist violent extremist organization whose members seek a pan-Islamic Caliphate that practices an orthodox and intolerant version of Islam. The group has and will continue to plan and conduct attacks against the unbelievers or the West. The West cannot expect Pakistan to counter or contain the group because a deeper understanding of Pakistani Military and the ISI reveals all three group's strategic goals are aligned. It is the prediction of this author a spectacular attack emanating from graduates of a LeT camp will occur on US soil in next 20 years if we chose to maintain the current policy towards Pakistan and its LeT.

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